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Abstract: Problem statement: Trade promotions provided to retailers from suppliers are not well 
understood and have not been consistently reported by manufacturers. Research about the phenomenon 
has consequently been limited and neither the trade nor government agencies fully understand the 
phenomenon and its implications. One implication is that some trade promotions (or trade allowances 
as  they  are  also  known)  can  pose  an  ethical  dilemma  in  terms  of  restricting  competition  to  the 
disadvantage of smaller businesses. Approach: This research takes advantage of a one-time release of 
data  at  the  individual  firm  level  which  includes  firm  specific  information  on  trade  promotions, 
which includes slotting fees, provided by manufacturers for placement in retail stores as well as 
advertising and promotion support for the retailer. Firm level specific data gives the researcher a 
method  of  analyzing  the  use  of  market  power  exercised  by  the  manufacturer  to  influence  retail 
behavior. Further, the analysis of trade promotion practices and market power give an indication of 
possible  uncompetitive  conditions  created  by  manufacturers  with  high  potential  market  power. 
Results: Findings indicate that firms with high potential market power, based on assets, provide more 
trade promotions. Firms with high profits derived from high gross margins, also exercise high market 
power. Both of these findings, in terms of potential market power as well as exercised market power, 
lend credibility to the argument that high market power firms pose an uncompetitive environment for 
small suppliers. Conclusion/Recommendations: The Federal Trade Commission (FTC), which previously 
reviewed this issue, needs to revisit the matter in terms of the creation of the uncompetitive environment that 
appears to be created through high market power firms. Further, research that considers both the retail and 
manufacturers’ firm-level data on a broad spectrum should be examined to better understand the situation.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
  Trade promotions are usually negotiated reductions 
in invoiced dollars from manufacturers to retailers and 
are  not  a  particularly  new  phenomenon.  However, 
research  into  how  they  work,  particularly  from  a 
supplier’s perspective, needs considerable development. 
The lack of firm-level data has seriously hampered the 
research into trade promotions, as most firms (retailers 
and manufacturers) have been reluctant to disclose their 
actual amounts (Gomez et al., 2007). It is likely that a 
major reason for the reluctance to disclose the financial 
information stems from the fact that trade promotions 
include slotting fees (among other promotional support) 
and have been the subject of much scrutiny for possibly 
being anti-competitive in nature (FTC, 2001). Debate 
and  discussion  about  trade  promotions  have  been 
ongoing for years, due in large part to the lack of data 
and lack of solid empirical research that  has resulted 
from  the  lack  of  information  (Nijs  et  al.,  2010). 
Therefore,  this  study  takes  advantage  of  a  one-time 
release of manufacturers’ data on trade promotions and 
demonstrates  how  the  trade  promotions  relate  to  the 
market power of manufacturers.  
  As  noted,  trade  promotions  include  slotting  fees, 
which are payments for advantageous shelf placement, 
cooperative advertising support and discounts on large 
quantity sales (Gomez et al., 2007). Additionally, since 
the trade promotions are normally made as a reduction to 
the invoice, they are also known as trade allowances and 
the terms are used interchangeably. To stay consistent, this 
study uses trade promotions exclusively in lieu of trade 
allowances or slotting fees. Trade promotions are used by 
manufacturers to influence the behavior of retailers with 
respect  to  shelf  placement,  addition  of  a  new  product, 
quantity  purchased,  or  other  promotional  support  of  a 
particular brand or item. Retailers, who often demand 
or negotiate the trade promotions have been happy to Am. J. of Economics and Business Administration 3 (3): 460-472 2011 
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receive  the  reductions  in  their  costs,  which  in  their 
perspective,  reduces  risk-particularly  from  new 
product  failure-  and  helps  to  mitigate  the  cost  of 
retailer advertising (Zerrillo and Iacobucci, 1995).  
  Relative  market  power  between  the  suppliers 
(manufacturers)  and  retailers  is  thought  to  affect  the 
amount  of  trade  promotion  (Zerrillo  and  Iacobucci, 
1995). From one perspective, manufacturers influence 
the behavior of retailers through offering generous trade 
promotions  to  retailers  who  consequently  have  less 
control of their own activities and  hence  their power 
(relative to the manufacturers) has been diminished in 
some respects. Manufacturers with more market power 
have  the ability (whether they use it or  not) to exert 
greater control at the consumer’s point of purchase than 
manufacturers with less market power. Conversely, in a 
market where many argue that retail market power has 
increased  considerably  over  manufacturer’s  market 
power (Kelly and Gosman, 2000) the retailers’ market 
power  may  be  used  to  extract  excessive  trade 
promotions  from  suppliers.  An  examination  of  a 
possible  market  power  shift  between  suppliers  and 
retailers is beyond the scope of this study. However, 
this  research  does  examine  the  relative  exercised 
market  power  among  suppliers  and  draws 
implications for retailers from the findings. One of 
the  key  questions  is  whether  the  exercised  market 
power  of  large  manufacturers  makes  an 
uncompetitive environment for small manufacturers, 
as has been argued before the FTC in the case trade 
promotions provided (FTC, 2001). 
  This  study  specifically  seeks  to  understand  the 
nature  and  measurement  of  market  power  from  one 
perspective the manufacturer’s and the amount of trade 
promotion it uses. The results of the research will shed 
light on the phenomenon of retailer and manufacturer 
relative market power but more on the nature of market 
power  of  manufacturers  and  their  use  of  trade 
promotions.  In  particular,  the  measurement  and 
definition of market power will be examined and it will 
be demonstrated that various manifestations of market 
power  have  differing  effects  upon  trade  promotion. 
Further,  the  role  of  industry  type  and  competitive 
intensity  within  given  industries  will  be  tested  to 
determine the relative importance of the trade promotion 
phenomenon in certain industries (product groups) relative 
to  others.  Finally,  the  relationship  of  promotion  and 
advertising expenditures (exclusive of trade promotions) 
relative  to  trade  promotions  spending  on  the  part  of 
manufacturer  will  be  examined.  The  pass-through  of 
savings from trade promotions to consumers is beyond the 
scope  of  this  study  and  has  been  examined  recently 
(Ailawadi and Harman, 2009; Nijs et al., 2010). 
Trade promotions: Trade promotions lower the cost of 
merchandise and/or advertising from the manufacturer 
and the reductions are passed to the retailer as special 
terms  on  invoices  (Skibo,  2007).  Examples  of  trade 
promotions include bulk purchases that are larger than 
normal  for  which  the  retailer  receives  a  discount 
(Ailawadi et al., 1999), slotting fees for new product 
placement  (Buzzell  et  al.,  1990),  slotting  fees  to 
maintain a presence on a store shelf (FTC, 2001; Bloom 
et al., 2000), in-store display promotions (Murry and 
Heide,  1998),  freight  rebates  (Skibo,  2007)  and 
advertising  and  promotional  support  including  co-op 
advertising,  manufacturer  supported  contests  and 
demonstrations (Kasulis et al., 1999). The practice is 
primarily,  but  not  exclusively,  associated  with  the 
grocery retail industry (Zerrillo and Iacobucci, 1995).  
  Invoice  terms  may  be  discount-based  or 
performance-based  (Gomez  et  al.,  2007).  Discount-
based  terms  mean  that  the  savings  to  the  retailer  are 
taken  directly  “off-invoice”  and  retailers  realize  the 
savings immediately (Bell and Dreze, 2002). Examples 
of  performance-based  terms  include  reductions  on 
future invoices for exceeding sales goals and for proof 
of advertising in order to receive the co-op advertising 
reimbursement.  Manufacturers  also  offer  financial 
terms,  such  as  extended  payment  schedules  as  an 
incentive, or waive freight charges as an incentive to 
place an order at a certain time (Skibo, 2007). 
  The  various  types  of  trade  promotions  and  the 
methods  of  providing  off-invoice  allowances  indicate 
that  the  trade  promotion  represents  a  complex 
phenomenon  that  takes  time  to  negotiate  and/or 
communicate.  Indeed,  the  literature  presents  strong 
evidence  that  the  amount  and  variety  of  trade 
promotions  grow  at  a  greater  rate  than  more 
conventional  advertising  and  promotion  expenses 
(Gomez et al., 2007) which show a relative decrease 
(Nijs  et  al.,  2010).  Together,  the  growth  in  trade 
promotion  activity,  the  individual  negotiations 
necessary,  the  complexity  of  types  of  trade 
promotions  and  the  lack  of  data  surrounding  the 
activity  underscore  the  need  for  a  greater 
understanding of the phenomenon.  
  Additionally,  the  magnitude  of  trade  promotions 
compared  to  advertising  expenses  proves  significantly 
larger for brand manufacturers (Gomez et al., 2007) and 
indeed constitutes the majority of most manufacturers’ 
marketing  budgets  (Pauwels,  2007).  Interestingly,  the 
tobacco industry, which has been increasingly restricted 
in  its  advertising  campaigns  in  the  U.S.  has  been 
aggressively pursuing trade promotions with retailers in 
order  to  influence  signage,  product  location  and  other 
retailer-focused incentives. Am. J. of Economics and Business Administration 3 (3): 460-472 2011 
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  Unfortunately, due to a multitude of methods used 
to  account  for  trade  promotions  in  the  past,  it  has 
been  impossible  to  follow  this  trend  clearly  from 
public accounting statements. It is also obvious that 
inconsistent  accounting  practices  among 
manufacturers had been helping to make the amount 
of  actual  advertising  and  promotional  expenses 
versus  trade  promotions,  which  are  netted  against 
sales,  unclear.  Further,  there  has  been  a  refusal  to 
disclose  trade  promotions,  which  has  further 
hampered  research.  Indeed,  research  into  trade 
promotions overall has been hampered by the lack of 
data (Gomez et al., 2007: Nijs et al., 2010). 
  Legal,  ethical  and  efficiency  arguments  have 
focused on trade promotions for more than a decade-
with an emphasis on implications of unfair competition. 
While these arguments are highly related, the literature 
has focused on each with differing degrees of intensity. 
The legal arguments generally focus on antitrust issues 
and the potential plaintiffs: small manufacturers, small 
retailers  and  the  Federal  Trade  Commission  (FTC) 
(Cannon and Bloom, 1991). Small manufacturers argue 
that  trade  promotions  are  onerous,  but  to  get  their 
products  shelved,  small  manufacturers  must  provide 
trade  promotions  and  sometimes  at  rates  higher  than 
those  provided  by  larger  manufacturers  (Cannon  and 
Bloom, 1991; Kelly, 1991). The Robinson-Patman Act, 
which deals with price and promotional discrimination, 
is the law that is most likely violated by current trade 
promotion practices (Cannon and Bloom, 1991). Small 
manufacturer’s complaints about trade promotions reflect 
the general market power issue. Overall, the question that 
this research seeks to answer is how manufacturer trade 
promotions reflect manufacturer market power.  
 
Market power and trade promotions: Market power 
is  the  relative  bargaining  position  and  ability  of  one 
firm  over  another  in  the  marketing  channel.  Market 
power  is  either  exercised  or  potential  in  nature  and 
measurement for exercised or potential market power 
types differ (Ailawadi et al., 1995). Market power is 
held by a variety of players in the distribution channel 
including the manufacturers, distributors, retailers and 
consumers. A manufacturer’s market power is defined 
in  potential  terms  as  being,  “those  industry 
characteristics  or  conditions  having  the  potential  to 
affect  the  manufacturer’s  power  in  the  marketplace” 
(Butaney  and  Wortzel,  1988).  Retailers,  on  the  other 
hand  have  the  potential  to  indirectly  intensify  price 
competition  among  manufacturers  (Draganska  and 
Klapper, 2007). 
  Some literature insists that retailers in general are 
gaining market power relative to manufacturers based 
on  industry  consolidations  (Zerrillo  and  Iacobucci, 
1995);  however,  the  evidence  for  grocery  retailers  is 
opposite  (Ailawadi  et  al.,  1995).  Additionally,  a 
longitudinal  analysis  of  large  public  retailers  of  all 
types found that only Wal-Mart was gaining in financial 
performance  (Evans,  2005)  while  all  other  retailers 
experienced  no  significant  change  in  financial 
performance. Financial performance represents a proxy 
for market power, hence there is scant evidence that a 
shift in market power is occurring. Interestingly, despite 
Wal-Mart’s obvious market power, it does not extract 
trade  promotions  from  its  suppliers  (Useem,  2004). 
Instead,  Wal-Mart  negotiates  price  breaks  from  its 
suppliers  and  thus  maintains  more  control  over  the 
display,  placement  and  marketing  of  its  merchandise 
than  do  retailers  that  extract  trade  promotions. 
However,  Wal-Mart  engages  in  very  aggressive 
promotional support negotiations (Walton, 2004-2005) 
and thus exerts market power while maintaining more 
internal  control  of  its  marketing  and  merchandising 
practices (placement of goods) than other retailers.  
  Given that market power and bargaining power go 
hand-in-hand,  it  is  likely  that  manufacturers  with  the 
greatest  amount  of  market  power  would  be  able  to 
negotiate  the  best  terms  with  retailers.  However,  the 
nature  of  those  terms  will  vary.  High  market  power 
manufacturers  may provide large trade promotions in 
order to stifle competition from smaller manufacturers. 
Conversely,  high-power  manufacturers  may  have 
stronger brand loyalty or support their product through 
other  means  (e.g.,  advertising)  than  do  low  market 
power  firms,  who  are  forced  to  provide  higher  trade 
promotions (Cannon and Bloom, 1991; Kelly, 1991). 
  This  apparent  divergence  in  the  relationship 
between the amount of trade promotions allowed by a 
manufacturer  and  the  manufacturer’s  market  power 
suggests  that  the  relationship  between  market  power 
and trade promotions should be examined from various 
perspectives  with  respect  to  the  nature  and  the 
measurement  of  market  power.  Indeed,  one  of  the  key 
issues in the literature of market power is how to measure 
it (Ailawadi et al., 1995). Traditional measures of market 
power have been in economic terms (usually profit) and 
tend to reflect a firm’s pricing power. A less traditional 
measure  of  market  power  is  in  terms  of  brand  equity 
(Sivakumar, 2004), or the manufacturer’s market power in 
“owning the brand” (Wood, 1999). Ailawadi et al. (1995) 
in-depth examination of market power argued that while 
profits  captured  some  aspects  of  market  power,  market 
power is related to the cost structure of the company return 
on equity and cost of capital. They proposed and tested a 
number of “Economic Value Added” (EVA) measures of 
market  power.  The  implication  of  their  research  is  that 
multiple measures of market power are strongly indicated. Am. J. of Economics and Business Administration 3 (3): 460-472 2011 
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Fig. 1: Trade promotion and market power 
 
  For purposes of this research, the market power is 
examined along two lines: “potential” and “exercised” 
market power (Ailawadi et al., 1995). Potential market 
power represents a firm’s dominance in the marketplace 
relative  to  other  firms.  Therefore,  potential  market 
power  measurements  are  generally  associated  with  a 
firm’s  size.  Larger  firms  are  more  powerful  in  the 
marketplace of products and are able to use this power 
to protect their competitive position. For example, Rao 
and Mahi (2003) posit that one interpretation of their 
findings is that higher trade promotions are extracted 
from manufacturers with the ability and willingness to 
pay.  Indeed,  if  this  is  true,  it  lends  credibility  to  the 
argument that larger manufacturers with higher market 
power can erect barriers to entry to smaller firms with 
less market power. Large firms with potential market 
power  would  be  characterized  as  those  firms  having 
high  market  share,  high  sales  and  high  sales  growth 
(Gomez et al., 2007) that can be used for more effective 
bargaining  of  trade  promotion  terms.  Arguably,  a 
manufacturer’s  assets  provide  a  measure  of  potential 
market  power  if  those  assets  can  be  translated  into 
dominance  in  the  marketplace.  This  resource-based 
view of the firm indicates that large assets are aligned 
with competitive dominance. More meaningfully, free 
cash flow relates directly to the manufacturer’s freedom 
to potentially exercise its market dominance.  
  While  size,  measured  by  a  number  of  means, 
indicates potential market power, profitability measures a 
firm’s exercised market power and its ability to extract 
excess  returns  from  its  customers.  When  high 
profitability is used as a measure of high market power, it 
captures a firm’s ability to price its product to earn higher 
returns  or  to  eliminate  costs  that  do  not  provide 
commensurate  returns.  However,  as  Ailawadi  et  al., 
(1995)  point  out,  profit  alone  is  a  very  incomplete 
measure  of  market  power.  In  the  case  of  trade 
promotions, higher profit will result from the judicious 
use trade promotions and indicates that the manufacturer 
has more bargaining power over retailers. Higher profit, 
especially when correlated with higher gross margin will 
indicate  that  fewer  price  concessions  are  made  (or 
exercised) by the manufacturer.  
  ROA has also been used as a measure of relative 
market power as it combines the potential market power 
measure  of  assets  with  the  exercised  market  power 
measure  of  profit.  Here,  the  market  power  measures, 
both  potential  and  exercised,  are  not  being  used  to 
assess the relative power of retailers to manufacturers, 
but rather to assess the degree to which market power 
affects  the  amount  of  trade  promotion  provided  to 
retailers. Indeed, manufacturers may decide to use trade 
promotions for strategic reasons even when retailers do 
not  pass  the  savings  on  to  customers-rather, 
manufacturers  appear  to  use  trade  promotions  as  a 
competitive tool (Silva-Risso et al., 1999). 
  Hence, a model of market power as measured by 
the  terms  discussed  above  is  shown  in  Fig.  1.  Not 
pictured in Fig. 1 is the obvious fact that the amount of 
trade promotion offered or negotiated with retailers is 
not  completely  dependent  upon  the  relative  market 
power of manufacturers one to another. However, the 
presumption is that firms exercise higher market power 
to  either  gain  or  maintain  a  competitive  advantage 
through  trade  promotions  or  other  means  (such  as 
advertising)  and  hence,  not  surprisingly,  firms  with 
high exercised market power will generally have higher 
trade  promotions.  Firms  with  low  potential  market 
power will be unable to meet the trade promotion levels 
provided by more powerful manufacturers. In general, 
it  is  expected  that  trade  promotions  provided  by 
manufacturers will vary based on the measurement of 
market  power  used  but  that  overall,  firms  with  more 
market  power,  either  exercised  or  potential,  will 
provide more trade promotions.  
  However, it is also expected that the market power 
of manufacturers and the amount of trade promotion will 
be  moderated  in  two  important  variables,  advertising 
expense and industry type, as shown in Fig. 1. 
 
Market  power,  trade  promotion  and  advertising 
expense:  As  noted  earlier  there  is  considerable 
evidence  that  manufacturers  are  reducing  traditional 
advertising and promotion expenses for more retailer-
focused trade promotions (Gomez et al., 2007; Zerrillo 
and  Iacobucci,  1995).  However,  a  manufacturer  has 
greater  market  power  when  it  has  a  strong  brand  or 
brands especially brand loyalty and brand equity. High 
brand power can be supported by both advertising and Am. J. of Economics and Business Administration 3 (3): 460-472 2011 
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promotion expense and by trade promotions. However, 
trade  promotions  that  focus  primarily  on  price 
concessions, which may be passed on at least in part to 
the  consumer,  do  not  indicate  brand  value.  Rather,  a 
manufacturer  with  a  strong  brand  or  brands  should 
minimize off-price trade promotions and focus on trade 
promotions  that  are  part  of  the  overall  integrated 
marketing  communication  strategy  such  as  in-store 
signage, co-op advertising support and similar activities 
(Kasulis et al., 1999). Consequently, it is expected that 
there  will  be  an  inverse  relationship  between  trade 
promotions and traditional advertising and promotional 
expenses. The alternative to the market power argument 
is that trade promotions efficiently diversify the risk of 
product  failure  between  the  retailer  and  the 
manufacturer. We include several control variables in 
our  empirical  models  to  control  for  the  efficiency 
arguments and industry differences. Additionally, it is 
expected  that  those  firms  with  greater  amounts  of 
traditional  advertising  and  promotion  expense,  which 
supports  the  development  of  strong  long-term  brand 
value,  will  have  lower  trade  promotions  despite  the 
manufacturer’s level of market power.  
 
Industry  type  and  competitive  intensity:  Different 
industry  types  (or  product  categories)  have  different 
characteristics  which  should  affect  the  relationship 
between  manufacturers  and  retailers.  For  example, 
Draganska and Klapper (2007) demonstrate that there 
are  differences  in  retailer/manufacturer  market  power 
relationships  based  on  competitive  intensity  between 
brands within a product category. Competitive intensities 
vary by industry. Market power in the channel between 
retailers and manufacturers is affected by the competitive 
intensity  within  different  industries  (Kadiyali  et  al., 
2000).  
  From  the  manufacturers’  standpoint  the 
competitive  intensity  within  an  industry  is  generally 
understood as having a high level of concentration with 
a  high  probability  of  vying  for  the  same  pool  of 
resources that may include customers (Barnett, 1997). 
Auh  and  Menguc,  2005)  define  competitive  intensity 
as, “a situation where competition is fierce due to the 
number of competitors in the market and the lack of 
potential opportunities for further growth. In the case of 
most  trade  promotions  offered  to  retailers, 
manufacturers are competing with one another for shelf 
space in the store, for amount of product purchased, for 
positioning  in  the  store,  for  signage,  for  point  of 
purchase  promotions  and  for  manufacturer  supported 
advertising  space  and  locations-especially  in  the 
grocery  industry.  Competitors  within  manufacturing 
categories  have  displayed  differences  in  competitor 
responses with respect to the size of a product category 
and the concentration level of the category (Pauwels, 
2007). Therefore, while different manufacturers within 
a  product  category  have  differing  degrees  of  market 
power,  it  is  expected  that  a  level  of  competitive 
intensity is distinct to different product categories and 
the product categories will therefore have a moderating 
effect  on  the  relationship  between  manufacturer’s 
market  power  and  the  trade  promotions  provided  to 
retailers as shown in Fig. 1. 
 
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
 
  In 2001, the Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF) of 
the HANS (2007) adopted Issue No. 01-9, “Accounting 
for Consideration Given by a Vendor to a Customer or 
a Reseller of the Vendor’s Products.” Issue No. 01-9, 
which codified and reconciled several previous issues, 
proscribes  the  proper  income  statement  classification 
for  trade  promotions  provided  from  a  vendor  to  a 
reseller. Trade promotions include, but are not limited 
to: Rebates, free products, volume rebates, placement 
fees,  cooperative  advertising  arrangements  and  buy-
downs. Previously, no specific accounting treatment for 
trade  promotions  had  been  required,  but  many 
manufacturers treated the expenses as operating costs-
specifically  advertising  and  promotional  expenses. 
After  the  accounting  treatment  change,  free  products 
and gifts are treated as a reduction of costs of goods 
sold and the other give-backs are treated as reductions 
of sales. The accounting change had no effect on firms’ 
net  incomes,  but  was  merely  a  reclassification  of 
expenses. Firms were required to disclose the effect of 
the change in accounting method for trade promotions 
in  their  publicly  filed  financial  statement  footnotes 
and most firms adopted the new accounting method 
for  reporting  years  beginning  after  December  15, 
2001. The change  in  accounting  method presents a 
window  of  opportunity  to  examine  the 
manufacturers’  characteristics  that  are  correlated 
with the amounts provided.  
 
Sample: To identify firms for our sample, we used the 
Mergent  Online  database,  which  includes  10,000 
publicly-traded U.S. companies. We primarily targeted 
manufacturing firms that either had Standard Industry 
Classification  (SIC)  code  of  20-28xx  (non-durable 
consumer  goods),  which  limited  the  search  to  food 
producers and producers of household chemicals. We 
limited our search to these manufacturers because we 
were interested in manufacturers that sell primarily to 
grocery  and  similar  retail  stores,  which  are  likely  to 
have similar trade promotion policies.  Am. J. of Economics and Business Administration 3 (3): 460-472 2011 
 
465 
  Using the SIC code initial criteria, Mergent Online 
identified 164 U.S. public firms. We used this sample 
as  a  starting  point  to  hand-collect  trade  promotion 
data  and  other  financial  data  from  the  firms’ 
financial  statements  available  on  Security  and 
Exchange  Commissions’  online  electronic  filing 
system (EDGAR). During data collection, numerous 
firms  were  eliminated  from  the  initial  sample.  We 
eliminated  firms  in  bankruptcy  or  with  terminated 
operations  (34  firms);  firms  that  primarily  sell 
directly  to  consumers  or  to  third-party  distributors 
(39  firms);  and  firms  with  incomplete  trade 
promotion disclosures (14 firms). We also eliminated 
beer, wine and spirit firms since distribution of their 
products  is  highly  regulated  and  governed  by  state 
laws (13 firms). Thus, we were left with 66 useable 
U.S. public firms and 193 firm-year observations.  
 
Model specification: The basic  model  for  measuring 
trade  promotion  (Fig.  1)  as  predicted  by  the  market 
power of suppliers is specified as follows:  
 
Trade Promotion = Potential Market Power + Exercised 
Market Power + ROA 
TradePro = b0 + b1lnSize + b2lnROA +  
b3lnAdvert + b4lnSaleG + 
b5lnOp$Flo + b6lnForeign + b7SICi + ei 
  Identifications  of  the  variables  are  specified  in 
Table 1. The equation is estimated using an ordinary 
least  squares  and  is  used  to  test  the  idea  that  high 
market power results in higher trade promotions. Note 
that as desirable as a Simultaneous Equation Modeling 
might be for estimating the diagrammed model, the data 
available were not adequate to run SEM. 
  In addition to the model above, several alternative 
model specifications are examined using the strategic 
profit model as guidance (Evans, 2005). The alternative 
specifications  substitute  components  of  Return  On 
Assets (ROA) to more finely specify which components 
of ROA affect trade promotions. Model 2 uses a first-
level breakdown and substitute’s net profit margin (a 
measure of profitability) and turnover (a measure of 
operational  efficiency)  into  the  model  for  ROA. 
Model  3  uses  a  second-level  breakdown  and 
substitutes gross profit margin (a measure of pricing 
power)  and  the  total  expense  ratio  (a  measure  of 
organizational control) for net profit margin.  
  Generally, if manufacturers had more power over 
retailers, then it would be expected that manufacturers 
would resist providing trade promotions. Conversely, if 
the market power lies with retailers, then it would be 
expected  that  retailers  could  exert  more  power  over 
manufacturers  and  demand  more  trade  promotions. 
Previous  research  has  indicated  a  power  shift  from 
manufacturers to retailers (Ailawadi et al., 1995). While 
research has not found a power shift (Evans, 2005), it is 
a commonly held belief among manufacturers. Several 
manufacturers  made  reference  to  this  alleged  shift  in 
market power and the demand for trade promotions in 
interviews. One major firm respondent indicated that, 
“in recent years there has been significant consolidation 
in the grocery industry through acquisitions. We have 
sought to establish and strengthen our alliance with key 
customers  by  offering  …  applications  to  assist  in 
managing inventories,” (Similarly, another major firm 
employee stated that, “retail consolidation has increased 
and  the  importance  of  major  customers  and  further 
consolidation  is  expected.”  Finally,  one  small 
manufacturer  noted  that,  “the  company  is  continually 
faced with demands for up-front concession, such as trade 
promotions;  from  major  retailers  …  the  company’s 
reluctance  to  pay  these  charges  may  inhibit  the  overall 
distribution of some items in certain markets or geographic 
regions.” While our sample data is not longitudinal and 
does not allow us to examine the shift in trade promotions 
provided  over  a  long  time  span,  at  least  anecdotally, 
manufacturing firm managers feel some increased pressure 
to offer more trade promotions to move product.  
 
Descriptive statistics: While data for every firm in our 
sample  for  each  year  is  not  available,  we  can  make 
some estimates for the trade promotions provided for the 
2000-2999 SIC manufacturers. In 2000, 57 firms in our 
sample  reported  providing  trade  promotions  of  almost 
$19.5 billion. In 2001, 53 firms reported providing $21.6 
billion in trade promotions. However, it should be noted 
that trade promotion practices vary by industry type and 
the SIC code examined in this research is most likely to 
have the highest degree of trade promotions. Industry-
wide figures for the amount of trade promotions provided 
have varied significantly, but the figures reported here 
are  arguably  more  accurate  than  prior  estimates.  The 
most current figure reported is, that across all industries 
in the U.S., the amount of trade promotions totals $75 
billion annually (Nijs et al., 2010). 
  To examine differences in trade promotions within 
industries, sample firms were grouped by their three-
digit  SIC  code.  The  mean  trade  promotion  was 
calculated for each industry group and the Ryan-Einot-
Gabriel-Welsch multiple range procedure was used to  
test  for  significant  differences  between  the  groups 
(Einot and Gabriel, 1975). Table 2 provides the three 
digit SIC code, industry group description, the industry 
group mean trading promotions amount as a percent of 
sales, number of sample firms and observations in each 
industry group and statistical tests difference between Am. J. of Economics and Business Administration 3 (3): 460-472 2011 
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groups. The results indicate that firms selling grain mill 
products (SIC 204´) on average provide significantly 
more trade promotions than any other industry group at 
16.8%.  The  high  trade  promotion  for  the  grain  mill 
products is not totally unexpected because this group 
includes  cereal  manufacturers,  which  are  generally 
considered  to  provide  high  trade  promotions. 
Processed  fruits  and  vegetables  (SIC  203´), 
beverages  (SIC  208)  and  bakery  goods  (SIC  205) 
also  provide  a  significant  percentage  of  trade 
promotions:  10.0,  7.1  and  7.1%,  respectively.  The 
remaining  cluster  of  firm’s  trade  promotions  range 
from 4.9% for sugar and confectionary products (SIC 
206´) to 0.9% for meat products (SIC 201´).  
 
Table 1: Variable descriptions 
  Description 
Dependent variable  Trade promotions divided by sales, net of trade promotions 
Trade promotions TradePro  ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Explanatory variables  Model  Description operationalized  Rationale 
Firm size lnSize  1, 2, 3  Natural logarithm of a   Larger firms have more market power and provide higher 
    firm’s total assets.   trade promotions. 
Return on assets lnROA  1  Net profit before interest 
    and taxes, divided total assets.  Firms with higher returns have more market power and provide 
      more trade promotions  
Net Profit margin lnNetPM  2  Net profit before interest and 
     taxes, divided by lagged net sales.   1st level break down of ROA into its components 
    (Ailawadi and Harlam, 2009)  Firms with higher profitability have more power and provide  
      more trade promotions. 
Gross margin lnGrM  3  Net sales less cost of goods  2nd level break down of ROA. Gross profit margin 
    sold divided by lagged net sales.  is a cleaner measure of pricing power  and higher 
      margins = higher market power  
Tot Expense ratio lnExp  3
  SG andA expenses divided  2nd level break down of ROA. 
     by lagged net sales.  Expense ratio is the other component that  
      with gross margin makes up net profit margin.  
Turnover lnTurns  2, 3  Lagged net sales divided by  1st level break down of ROA 
     total assets.  Together margin and turnover make up return on assets.  
Advertising lnAdvert  1, 2, 3  Total advertising costs, excluding  A control variable. Firms that provide more 
     trade promotions, divided by  advertising may have lower product risk 
     lagged net sales. 
Sales growth lnSalesG  1, 2, 3  Percentage sales increase in the  A control variable. Firms with higher sales growth 
     current period over the prior   may have lower product risk 
    period (Sales0-Sales-1) / Sales-1. 
Operating $ flow lnOp$Flo  1, 2, 3  Current year operating cash flows   A control variable. Firms with higher operating 
    divided by lagged net sales.  cash flow may have more ability to provide  
      more trade promotions 
Foreign sales lnForeign  1, 2, 3  Non-North American sales divided   A control variable. Trade promotions in foreign 
    by total lagged sales  jurisdictions may differ.  
SIC   1, 2, 3  Three digit standard industry  A control variable. Controls for industry differences 
SIC    classification  that may affect trade promotions provided  
      (Butaney and Wortzel, 1988)  
1Independent  variables  are  scaled  by  lagged  net  sales,  when  appropriate,  rather  than  current net  sales, because  scaling  the  dependent  and 
independent variables by the same value induces correlation. Model:  (1) TradePro = b0 + b1lnSize + b2lnROA + b3lnAdvert + b4lnSaleG + 
b5lnOp$Flo + b6lnForeign + b7SICi + eI (2) TradePro = b0 + b1lnSize + b2lnNetPM + b3lnTurns + b4lnAdvert + b5lnSaleG + b6lnOp$Flo + 
b7lnForeign + b7SICi + ei (3) TradePro = b0 + b1lnSize + b2lnGrM + b3lnExpM + b4lnTurns + b5lnAdvert + b6lnSaleG + b7lnOp$Flo + 
b8lnForeign + b9SICi + ei 
 
Table 2: Mean industry group trade promotions 
Three digit    Mean trade promotions  # of firms  Means with same letter are not 
SIC code  Industry group description  as a percent of sales    (observations)  significantly different 
204  Grain mill products  16.80  515)   A 
203  Canned, frozen and preserved fruits and vegetables  10.00  11(28)   B 
208  Beverages  7.10  6(16)   BC 
205  Bakery products  7.10  6(15)   BC 
206  Sugar   and confectionary products  4.90  5(18)   CD 
284  Soap, detergents and cleaning preparations  3.90  14(40)   CD 
202  Dairy products  3.80  4(14)   CD 
209  Misc. food preparations and kindred  3.60  7(21)   CD 
201  Meat products  0.90  8(26)   D Am. J. of Economics and Business Administration 3 (3): 460-472 2011 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
Description
1 variable name  Mean (Std. Dev.)  Minimum value  First quartile  Median  Third quartile  Maximum value 
Trade promotions   0.060  0.000  0.000  0.037  0.102  0.299 
TradePro  (0.068) 
Total assets  3.6 bil  47.655  37.100 mil  468.500 mil  2.900 bil  55.800 bil 
Size  (8.3 bil) 
Return on assets  0.121  -0.339  0.071  0.114  0.168  0.710 
ROA  (0.101) 
Net profit margin  0.095  -0.237  0.046  0.082  0.145  0.303 
NetPM  (0.076) 
Gross profit margin  0.362  0.046  0.231  0.355  0.460  0.998 
GrM  (0.167) 
Total expense ratio  0.267  0.042  0.131  0.262  0.342  0.899 
Exp  (0.154) 
Turnover  1.598  0.298  1.071  1.454  2.008  4.525 
Turns  (0.798) 
Advertising/lag sale  0.043  0.000  0.001  0.022  0.058  0.500 
Advert  (0.065) 
Sales growth  0.097  -0.243  0.014  0.065  0.138  0.914 
SaleG  (0.160) 
Op $ Flo/lag sale  0.084  -0.129  0.041  0.073  0.130  0.266 
Op$Flo  (0.065) 
Foreign sale/lag sale  0.121  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.162  0.751 
Foreign  (0.201) 
 
  Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for the entire 
sample. Trade promotions granted are on average 6.0% of 
sales,  with  one  firm  providing  as  much  as  29.9%.  Our 
sample size ranged from one firm with just over $47,600 
in total assets to another firm with $55.5 billion in assets, 
the  average  being  $3.6  billion.  ROA  ranges  from  a 
negative 33.9% to positive 71.0%, with the average being 
a  positive  12.1%.  The  negative  ROA  and  negative  net 
profit margin indicate that some firms in our sample were 
operating at a loss after subtracting all operating expenses. 
The gross profit margin more tightly captures firm mark-
ups and ranges from 4.6% to a high of 99.8%, with the 
average  of  36.2%.  Our  sample  firms  on  average  spent 
about 4.6% of sales on adverting, but one firm spent 50%. 
Finally, fewer than half of the firms in our sample have no 
sales outside of North America.  
 
RESULTS 
 
  Before  analyzing  the  results,  we  tested  whether 
either  influential  outliers  or  multicollinearity  affected 
the regression results. DFFITS and DFBETA diagnostic 
cutoffs as suggested by Kutner et al. (2004) indicated 
several  highly  influential  outliers  that  had  significant 
influence  over  the  results.  Eliminating  these 
observations from the data set had little effect as the 
problem  cascaded  down  and  other  outliers  become 
highly influential. Our solution was to use the logarithm 
of the independent variables in the regression models to 
limit  the  influence  of  outliers.  While  using  the 
logarithm  reduced  the  outlier  problem,  it  did  not 
eliminate it. So, the logged variables were winsorized to 
four standard deviations above and below the mean.  
  The  correlation  matrix  for  the  explanatory 
variables  is  presented  in  Table  4.  Several  of  the 
variables  are  highly  correlated  and  multicollinearity 
was  a  concern.  The  econometric  problem  with 
multicollinearity is that it inflates the variance making it 
more difficult to achieve significance of the collinear 
parameters;  however,  if  such  collinear  estimates  are 
statistically significant, they are as reliable as any other 
variables  in  a  model.  To  examine  the  impact  of 
muliticollinearity  on  the  results,  Variance  Inflation 
Factors (VIFs) were calculated for the variables. The 
VIF scores were all below 10 and multicollinearity 
was deemed not to be a problem. Thus, while some 
of  the  variables  are  highly  correlated  with  one 
another,  the  variables  are  not  correlated  with  the 
dependent variable in the same way when included in 
the multiple regression models.  
  Table  5  presents  the  ordinary  least  squares 
regression  results  for  the  trade  promotion  models, 
which all primarily rely upon the strategic profit model. 
Models 1-3 use strategic profit model broken down into 
various components to better isolate firm profitability. 
Model  1  uses  ROA  as  the  measure  of  profitability; 
Model 2 breaks down ROA into net profit margin and 
turnover;  and  Model  3  breaks  down  the  net  profit 
margin into a gross profit margin and an expense ratio. 
Models 4-6 reexamine Models 1-3, but include some 
additional interactions that were found by Sudhir and 
Rao  (2006)  to  be  important  for  explaining  trading 
promotions  provided.  Two  main  results  can  be 
gleaned    from    Models  1-3.  First,  larger  firms 
provide more in trade promotions the coefficient on 
lnSize  is  positive  and  significant  in  three models.  Am. J. of Economics and Business Administration 3 (3): 460-472 2011 
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Table 4:  Spearman and pearson correlation matrices of descriptive 
variables
1 
  Pearson correlations
1 
  --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Spearman  lnSize
2  lnROA  lnAdvert  lnSaleG  lnOp$Flo  lnForeign 
lnSize
3    0.26**  0.21**  -0.01  0.23**  0.58**  
lnROA  0.27**    0.01  -0.02  0.43**  0.24**  
lnAdvert  0.29**  0.15*    0.21**  0.23**  0.39*   
lnSaleG  -0.97  0.06  0.16**    0.13*  -0.08   
lnOp$Flo  0.26**  0.48**  0.32**  0.12*    0.29** 
lnForeign  0.66**  0.30**  0.34**  -0.12  0.25** 
1Spearman rank correlation coefficients are reported below the diagonal 
and Pearson correlation coefficients are reported above the diagonal  
2Correlation  p-values  significant  at  the  .10  level  (two-tailed)  are 
identified with * and correlation p-values significant at the 0.05 level 
(two-tailed) are identified with **
3See Table 1 for variable definitions 
 
The lowest level of significance is in Model 3 (t = 5.05, 
p<0.01). These results support the hypothesis that firms 
with more potential market power, as measured by total 
assets,  provide  more  in  trade  promotions  than  small 
firms.  
  The second main result is that firms that exercise 
their  market  power  and  have  higher  levels  of 
profitability provide more in trade promotions, as the 
coefficients for profitability variables are all significant 
and  positive.  In  Model  1,  lnROA  is  positive  and 
significant  (t  =  2.08,  p<0.05),  indicating  that  firms 
generating higher returns to assets provide higher trade 
promotions. To isolate whether the results for lnROA 
are  attributable  to  manufacturing  profitability  (profit 
margin) or operational efficiency (turnover), Model 2 
further breaks down lnROA into these components. The 
results for Model 2 indicate that lnNetPM is positive 
and  significant  (t  =  2.21,  p<0.05)  but  lnTurns  is  not 
significant  (t  =  -0.57,  p<0.60),  which  indicates  that 
manufacturers  with  higher  margins  and  profitability 
provide  significantly  more  trade  promotion  fees,  but 
that  manufacturers’  operational  efficiency  does  not 
affect  trade  promotion  fees  provided.  The  final 
breakdown in Model 3 further isolates profitability into 
pricing  power  (gross  margin)  and  administrative 
support  (expense  ratio).  lnGrM  is  positive  and 
marginally significant (t = 1.96, p<0.10) indicating that 
firms  with  higher pricing power provide higher trade 
promotions.  In  addition,  the  expense  ratio  (lnExp)  is 
negative  and  significant  (t  =  -2.11,  p<0.05),  which 
indicates that firms with higher levels of sales, general 
and  administrative  expenses  provide  lower  trade 
promotions.  One  interpretation  of  the  results  on  the 
expense  ratio  is  that  manufacturers  that  have  higher 
expense  for  other  operating  expenses  provide  higher 
levels of support to retailers and consequently provide 
less  in  trade  promotions.  Overall,  these  results  lend 
support  to  the  argument  that  larger  more  profitable 
firms  provide  more  in  trade  promotions  to  maintain 
the  status  quo  and  to  limit  competition.  None  of 
advertising,  sales  growth,  nor  controls  for  product 
risk, are significant. Thus, the results do not support 
the  argument  that  trade  promotions  are  provided  to 
mitigate product failure risk.  
  Several additional results with regard to Models 1-
3  deserve  note.  While  not  reported,  the  dummy 
variables  for  the  three-digit  SIC  industry  affiliation 
code were all significant in all three models, indicating 
that research into trade promotions should control for 
industry  differences.  The  control  variable  for  foreign 
sales  (lnForeign)  was  consistently  negative  and 
significant  in  all  the  models;  the  lowest  level  of 
significance was in Model 3 (t = -4.68, p<0.01), indicating 
that  firms  with  larger  sales  outside  of  North  America 
provide less trade promotions. One possible explanation 
for this result is that trade promotions are primarily used as 
a negotiating tool in North America and less so in other 
parts  of  the  world.  Operating  cash  flow  (lnOp$Flo)  is 
negative and marginally significant in both Models 2 and 3 
(t = -1.83, p<0.10) and (t = -1.72, p<0.10), respectively. 
One possible explanation is that higher cash flows are not 
indicative of providing lower trading promotions, but that 
firms that do not provide trade promotions in turn have 
higher cash flow from operations. 
  Various alternative specifications of the Models 1-3 
were examined. One specification substituted market share 
a firm’s lagged sales divided by total industry sales from 
the United States Census Bureau for a firm’s total assets as 
the  size  variable.  The  market  share  variable,  which  is 
highly correlated with size, might be a stronger indicator 
of market power than total assets since market power is 
not necessarily derived from assets controlled but from the 
share of the total sales controlled. 
  The  market  share  variable  was  significant  in 
Model  1  (t  =  2.34,  p<0.05),  but  insignificant  in 
Models  2  and  3  and  the  other  results  were 
econometrically  similar.  In  addition,  all  model  fit 
statistics  declined.  Another  specification  examined 
whether the percentage of sales to Wal-Mart affected 
trade  promotions  provided,  since  Wal-Mart 
reportedly does not collect trade promotions (Useem, 
2004).  The  Wal-Mart  variable  is  not  significant  in 
Models 1-3 (t = 1.14, p<0.30, in Model (1) and all 
other  results  are  econometrically  similar.  (This 
variable  was  included  for  Wal-Mart’s  assertion 
(Walton,  2004-2005)  that  they  do  not  accept  trade 
promotions). 
  Two  additional  dimensions  of  the  trade 
promotion  fee  model  were  examined:  Product  risk 
and     firm     reputation.    If     trade  promotions 
are  compensation  for  product  risk,  then  trade 
promotions  are  expected  to  be  higher   when a 
new untested product is introduced  (Desiraju, 2001).   Am. J. of Economics and Business Administration 3 (3): 460-472 2011 
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Table 5: Regression results (Dependent variable (TradePro): firms trade promotions as a percentage of sales) 
   Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
Explanatory        Size and ROA  Size and net   Size and gross 
variables
1  ROA  Profit margin  Gross margin  Interactions  margin interactions   margin interactions 
Intercept  -0.2380***  -0.1960***  -0.1920***  -0.1260***  -0.0340  0.1000 
lnSize  0.0120***  0.0110***  0.0110***  0.0060**  0.0020  -0.0050 
lnROA  0.1050**      -1.1100*** 
lnNetPM    0.1750**      -1.2730*** 
lnGrM      0.2010*      -1.7480*** 
lnExp      -0.2100**      1.3290** 
lnTurns    -0.0090  -0.0090    -0.0940  -0.1250 
lnAdvert  0.0950  0.1060  0.1190  0.0540  0.0760  0.0720 
lnSaleG  -0.0040  -0.0140  -0.0110  0.0250  0.0030  0.0100 
lnOp$Flo  -0.0860  -0.1510*  -0.1440*  -0.1520**  -0.1640**  -0.1550* 
lnForeign  -0.1650***  -0.1530***  -0.1480***  -0.1740***  -0.1700***  -0.1730*** 
lnSize X lnROA        0.0680*** 
lnSize X lnNetPM          0.0750***    
lnSize X lnTuns          0.0050  0.0060 
lnSize X lnGrM            0.1000*** 
lnSize X lnExp            -0.0770** 
N  193.0000  193.0000  193.0000  193.0000  193.0000  193.0000 
R
2  0.5550  0.5490  0.5480  0.5800  0.5750  0.5750 
Adj. R
2  0.5100  0.5110  0.5070  0.5450  0.5330  0.5280 
F-statistic  15.2500  14.3500  13.3300  16.3200  13.9100  12.3100 
Prob > F  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001 
1See Table 1 for variable definitions.  * Significant at the .10 level; ** Significant at the .05 level; *** Significant at the .01 level (All two-tailed) 
 
The number of product introductions by sample firms 
was not readily available, so to proxy for new product 
introductions,  a  firm’s  research  and  development 
expense,  scaled  by  lagged  sales,  was  included  in  the 
models.  If  research  and  development  projects  are 
undertaken to develop new products, then it should be a 
good proxy for product introductions. The research and 
development variable was not significant in Models 1-3 
(t = -0.63, p <0.60 in Model 1) and all other results 
were econometrically similar. Finally, Sudhir and Rao 
(2006)  found  that  firm  reputation  was  negatively 
correlated with trade promotions, such that firms with 
higher  reputations  provide  less  trade  promotions.  To 
proxy  for  firm  reputation,  a  dummy  variable  was 
included  for  firms  included  in  the 
Businessweek/Interbrand’s  ranking  of  the  100  most 
valuable  brands.  Our  sample  included  nine  firms  (34 
observations) that were ranked in the 100 most valuable 
brands. The rank variable, however, was not significant 
(t  =  -0.22,  p<0.90  in  Model  (1)  and  all  other  results 
were qualitatively similar. To explore higher order effects 
and  examine  whether  large  firms’  behavior  toward 
providing  trade  promotions  differs  from  small  firms, 
Models 1-3 were reexamined by including an interaction 
term  between  the  size  and  profitability  variables.  The 
interaction  terms  allow  us  to  more  tightly  isolate  how 
potential market power (lnSize) and exercised market size 
(profitability)  affect  trade  promotions  provided;  these 
results are reported in Table 5 as Models 4-6. Sudhir and 
Rao  (2006)  examined  the  various  interactions  between 
large firms, those with over $1 billion in sales and other 
variables in their model. 
  The  size  and  profitability  interaction  terms  in 
Models  4-6  are  all  positive  and  highly  significant: 
lnSize x lnROA (t = 3.85, p<0.01), lnSize x lnNetPM (t 
= 3.26, p<0.01) and lnSize x lnGrM (t = 3.25, p<0.01). 
The interpretation of the interaction term is that the rate 
of trade promotions provided is increasing in a firms’ 
profitability, which is magnified for increasingly larger 
firms.  That  is,  larger  firms  with  higher  profitability 
provide  higher  rates  of  trade  promotions  than  larger 
firms  with  lower  profitability  or  smaller  firms  with 
higher  profitability.  These  results  are  consistent  with 
prior findings in Models 1-3, that firms more potential 
market power (size) and more exercised market power 
(profitability)  provide  higher  levels  of  trade 
promotions. In Model 6, the lnSize´lnExp interaction 
also is significant (t = -2.54, p <0.05). Post-hoc analysis 
indicates  that  larger  firms  with  higher  operating 
expenses provide decreasingly less in trade promotions 
than  smaller  firms.  This  result  is  consistent  with  the 
results in Model 3 and suggests firms provide less trade 
promotions  when  operating  expenses  are  higher,  but 
that the decrease is more pronounced for larger firms. 
Both  operating  cash  flows  and  foreign  sales  are 
negative and significant in Models 4-6, suggesting that 
firms with higher cash flows and more sales outside of 
North  America  provide  less  in  trade  promotion  fees. 
Finally, none of the proxies for product risk advertising 
or  sales  growth  are  significant  in  the  model  of  trade 
promotions provided.  Am. J. of Economics and Business Administration 3 (3): 460-472 2011 
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DISCUSSION 
 
  The findings of this research support the argument 
that there is a relationship between the market power of 
manufacturers and the trade promotions granted. This 
research  finds  that  both  potential  market  power  and 
exercised market power are positively correlated with 
trade  promotions,  which  supports  the  argument  that 
higher  power  firms,  as  measured  by  size  and 
profitability,  provide  higher  trade  promotions.  This 
further supports the idea that the practice of providing 
trade promotions reduces smaller firms’ opportunities. 
Additionally,  there  is  little  evidence  that  the  trade 
promotions provided are functions of risk factors. The 
implication is that less powerful firms that are unable to 
provide  trade  promotions  may  be  excluded  from  the 
market. The impact of the high market power firms is 
that  small  manufacturers  cannot  afford  to  enter  the 
market.  Eventually,  product  variety  and  product 
innovation may suffer and the ultimate cost would be 
borne  by  the  consumers.  Further  examination  of  this 
issue is needed. If it can be shown that the current trade 
promotion  practices  restrain  trade  and  inhibit 
competition,  then  regulatory  intervention  and  policy 
changes  might  be  necessary.  Public  policy  reforms 
could address either the uniformity of trade promotions 
provided or their elimination altogether. One possible 
short-term implication for disallowing trade promotions 
is that consumer prices may increase (FTC, 2001).  
  An  obvious  limitation  of  this  research  into  trade 
promotion is that no retailer data is examined. Future 
research  should  seek  to  examine  this  issue  from  the 
retailers’ perspective. One important example of such 
research is Sudhir and Rao (2006) who examine trade 
promotions  provided  by  manufacturers  to  one  retail 
chain. An additional limitation of this study is the focus 
on  manufacturers  in  specific  industry  groups,  which 
limits the generalizability of the results. Future research 
could  seek  to  expand  the  sample  group  into  other 
industry groups that use various distributional channels 
for delivery of their product. A greater challenge is to 
separate out various kinds of trade promotions and to 
not only capture the slotting fee provided to shelve a 
product,  but  to  refine  the  amount  provided  for  a 
particular placement on the shelf. 
  Early research into an area using previously unused 
and  unavailable  data  often  runs  the  risk  of  omitted 
variables bias and other model misspecification problems. 
Future  research  may  examine  additional  and  alternative 
measures of manufacturer market power and product risk. 
One such extension could be to include actual new product 
introductions  into  the  model  to  better  examine 
distributional efficiency issues, since product introductions 
implicitly have higher risk of failure.  
  Given  the  inclusiveness  of  the  new  FASB 
standards for trading promotion, other sources of data 
must be sought that will allow research to differentiate 
between  the  various  types.  Arguably,  coupons  are 
extremely different in their overall marketplace effects 
from providing a slotting fee for a particular amount or 
location  of  shelf  space.  Further  separation  of  the 
different  components  is  important  for  both  regulators 
and  marketers  to  understand  negotiated  trade 
promotions. The negotiated aspect of trade promotions 
needs additional research as well.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
  To date, the role of trade promotions  is  still not 
well understood and clearly more research is needed. 
Indeed, much of the educational material in textbooks 
and  case  studies  has  little  more  than  a  glancing 
reference  to  the  practice.  The  value  of  prime  shelf 
placement  is  well  known,  but  understanding  the 
dynamics  of  how  much  manufacturers  are  willing  to 
provide  for  that  space  is  not.  Further,  anecdotal 
evidence indicates that high promotional value placed 
on  a  blockbuster,  “hot”  new  product  mitigates  the 
amount  of  trade  promotions.  However,  no  evidence 
exists.  Finally,  the  amount  of  pass-through  to 
consumers  of  trade  promotion  money  is  unknown  in 
this  study  (Pauwels,  2007).  There  is  obviously  more 
work to be done on this subject.  
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